A distinctive feature of models of female labor supply is the míxed discrete-continuous nature of the dependent variable. As long as the female labor supply decision is analyzed in isolation, it is of minor consequence for the estimation method whether the labor supply (or leisure demand) equation is derived within a utility maximízation framework or not. In both cases Tobit-like methods are the appropriate tools for the estimation of the model. A number of authors have estimated models of female labor supply along these lines, e.g. Heckman (1974) , Hausman (1980) and Zabalza (1983) . However, if female labor supply is analyzed jointly with other household decision variables such as male labor supply or commodity demands, both modelling and estimatíon within a utility maximization framework becomes more complicated.
One of the main reasons for this complication is that one has to derive equations that give optimal demands for all goods and male leisure if the female partner does not work. As has been shown by Deaton and Muellbauer (1981) , the class of utility or cost functions for which these conditional or rationed demand equations can be derived explicitly, is quite restrictive.
One of the very few empirical studies on household labor supply and rationing is the paper by Blundell and Walker (1982) . In the estíma-tion of their model only observations on two earner families (i.e. unrationed families) are used with a correction for section bias. The obvious drawback of their approach (apart from the fact that they employ a restrictive functional form) is that a usually large proportion of the available data (the one earner families) is not iised in the estimatíon.
Moreover, it is possible that parameter estimates based on data on two earner families only do not apply to one earner families because of factors not cap[ured by the model.
In this paper we estimate a household labor supply model using data on both one earner and two earner families, and using flexible functional forms. Sínce in this case there exists no explicit closed form for the rationed demand equations, numerical methods are used.
In section 2 we introduce Deaton and Muellbauer's Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) as our choice of functional form for the descripz tion of household labor supply, we present a simple way of incorporating family composition effects into the model and we briefly discuss the theory of rationing within the AIDS-framework. In section 3 the stochastic specification of the model ís presented with the corresponding likelihoods. The data is described in section 4. Estimation results are given in section 5. Section 6 concludes. Demand System (AIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, 1980b) .
Within a labor supply context it has been used before by Ray (1982 This leads to the following specifications for the AIDS uncompensated unrationed demand for leisure functions:
Rm -(Ylwm)(am~mm log wm~mf log wff1'my log PtBm log Y-sm.a) (2.9)
Rf -(Ylwf)(af~mf log wm~l'ff log wf{1'fy log Pt6f log Y-Bf-a) (2.10)
where km and Rf are male and female leisure respectively.
In contrast with the linear specifications used by Blundell and Walker (1982) and those discussed by Deaton and Mullbauer (1981) where labor supply functions are either everywhere forward bending or everywhere backward bending, the AIDS labor supply functions can be forward bending in a certain range of wages and backward bending in a different range.
The effect of family composition on labor supply is modelled by allowing the a's to depend on the family size:
ai -a~f ai log N , i-m,f,y
where N is the number of persons in a family.
It is easily verified that g w w 3 log N x am log(P) f af log( f) P (2.12) (2.13)
which we expect to be positive. Of course, the number of persons in a family is a rather crude indicator of family composítion, but since the modelling of demographic variables is not the primary aim of this paper,
we will stick to this rather simple specification. In any case, we allow the effect of family size to be dífferent for different expenditure categories. As such it is slightly more general than the specification used by Ray (1982) .
Rationing
The rationing theory employed here has been developed by Neary and Roberts (1980) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, 1981) . Let us consider the case where female leisure Rf is restric[ed to be equal to Rf.
Then the rationed cost function for the household is defined as R -Ĩ (u.wm~wf.PrRf) -min (wmkmfwfRffp.y v~u) , (2.14) Y.Rm where v(km,Rf,y) is the direct household utility function defined on male and female leisure and total household consumption.
There is a well-known relationship between the rationed and unrationed cost function:
(2.15)
where wf -~(u,Rf,wm,p,u) is obtained by settíng the compensated demand
Eor female leisure equal to Rf and solving for Wf~i.e. Wf is the female wage rate which would induce the household to choose R-R if there f f were no rationing. Here ( T-Rf).wf i s the amount of money earned by the female partner in market work. Since wf i s the shadow price of female leisure, w R is f' f the value to the household of the female leisure. So y is the subjectively valued full i ncome i n the case of rationin~. We already know that the rationed compensated demand i s equal to the unrationed compensated 7 demand with wf replaced by wf. From (2.18) it is clear that we obtain the ratíoned uncompensated demand from the unrationed uncompensated demand if we replace wf everywhere by wf and Y by Y. So, for example, the restricted demand for male leisure RR is obtained from (2.9) as m Rm -(Ylwm)(amfl'~log wmi~`fmf log wf~-`fmy log PfBm log Y-Sm.a) (2.20)
Using (2.10) it i s also clear that wf must satisfy:
Rf -(Y~wf)(af~mf log wm~ff l08 wf~1'fy log Ptsf log Y-Bf.
a). (2.21)
It follows from the analysis by Neary and Roberts (1980) that if the parameters of the AIDS specification are such that the direct utility function v is quasi-concave, there will exist a wf~wf satisfying (2.21) for any Qf in the domain of v. In contrast with the essentially linear specifications used by, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer (1981) and Blundell and Walker (1982) , with AIDS there does not exist an explicit solution for wf. T'herefore, in the estimation of the model, numerical methods will be used.
We will particularly be interested i n the case Rf -T, i .e. when the female does not have a paid job. In that case we have
which would be the full income if the female wage rate were equal to wf.
It should be emphasized that the present rationing model is essentially different from the Rationed Almost Ideal Demand System (RAIDS) due tot Deaton (1981) . The RAIDS only allows for deriving utility-consistent rationed demand functions, given the ration level. In the present case we have a matchE:d pair of ratíoned and unrationed demand functions, consistently describing behavíor under both regimes. 8
F.stimation
The only form of rationing considered in estimation ís the case where the female partner attains the maximal amount of leisure, i.e., she does not have a paid job. In that case she is rationed at Rf -T. We shall estimate a model of joint labor supply of the male and the female partner in a household and of total consumption. As always, the budget constraint (in this case the full income constraint) allows us to drop one equation. We have chosen to omit the demand for total consumption equation so that we are left with a system of two labor supply equations (or, equivalently, demand for leisure equations) for the male and female partner.
Let us introduce the following notation with respect to the i-th household:
i E 61 if both partners work;
i E eo if only the male partner works. The error terms in ( 3. 3' ) and ( 3. S' ) are equal since the only difference is that wf is replaced by wf. However, if the em and ef would incorporate random preferences, then the error terms in (3.3') and (3.5') cannot be both additive and normally distributed. For example, let ef -uf t vf, where uf represents random variation of preferences across households and vf represents other sources of random variation in female leisure. Assume both uf and vf to be normally distributed. For a rationed household, wf is the solution of T -gf(wm,wf,P,u) f uf (3.6)
As a result the shadow wage wf is a complicated non-linear function of uf. Hence, wf is a random variable and its distribution is definitely nonnormal. So, assuming an additive normally dístributed error terms in (3.1') appears ínconsistent with an additive normally distributed error term in (3.5').
The non-normality of wf need not be a problem in itself. The densities that appear in the likelihood function in the case of random preferences involve the shadow wage, which has to be integrated out.
This can be performed using numerical íntegration techniques and therefore, the exact distributional form is of minor importance. However, generally these densities cannot be ensured to be proper ones. The rea-son is that the existence and the uniqueness of the shadow wage cannot always be guaranteed, unless the cost function is globally concave. It can be shown that the AIDS cost function is globally concave if and only if all S's are equal to zero and a(wm,wf,p) given in (2.2) is concave (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b) . However, in that case preferences are homothetic and the flexibility is lost. It appears that, at least for AIDS, flexibility and global concavity of the cost function are incompatible properties.
In view of these problems, we have adopted the following pragma- From this sample we took a subsample of households containing at least two adults of different sex, where the male partner is an employed wage earner. The size of the subsample is 507; in 197 households the female partner is also an employed wage earner, in 310 households the female partner does not have a paid job. Thus, we excluded the selfemployed, the households with only one adult, the households where the male partner is unemployed, retired, going to school, dísabled, etc.
To be able to estimate model (3.1")-(3.5") we need observations on (potential) wage rates, also of females who díd not have a paid job at tlie time of the survey. We followed the standard procedure of constructing a wage equation for females on the basis of the households for which we observe the female wage rate. In our sample, this is only the case for the 139 households where the female partner works at least 15 hours a week.
Using Heckman's procedure to correct for selectivity bias, the following wage equation was estimated (t-values in parentheses):
wf -2.14 t 0.26 AGE -0.003 AGE2 -E 1.68 DUM1~-(0.36) (0.63) (-0.74) (1.32) 2.12 DUM2 t 3.01 DUM3 t 1.69 a, R2 -0.14 (2.78) (1.23) (1.34) DUM1, DUM2 and DUM3 are dummy variables to represent education, a is the estimated inverse of the Mill's-ratio (see Heckman (1979) ).
In the estima[ion of the model the predicted values (with omission of a) for both participating and non-participating females were used as an instrument for female wage rate. 
Results
The results of the ML-estimation for both cases are summarized in table 1. In the first place we notice that the estimates obtained in case I are the most accurate ones, because more observations are used than in the other case.
In case I the joint hypothesis am a am and p(em'Ef) -p(Em'ef)
is rejected at the 5X-level on the basis of a likelihood ratio test.
Although the differences between the columns seem to be quite small, a likelihood ratio test of the equality of parameters across columns rejects the equality hypothesis.I) There may be a number of explanations for these significant differences. For example, ít may be due to a neglect of the possibly important effect of fixed costs of entering the labor market, or may be family composition effects should be incorporated more elaborately. Whatever the reason might be, it is clear that one has to be careful ín using data on two earner households only to also explain the behavior of one earner households, even if selection bias has been taken into account.
In the remainder of this section we will concentrate on the estimation results of case I. In figure 1 the labor supply functions implied by the parameter estímates are drawn.
1) The parameter estimates of case I were inserted in the likelíhood function of case II and vice versa. In both cases the resulting test statistic implied rejection at the 5i-level of the equality hypo[hesis. a) a0 was fixed a priori for computatíonal reasons (see Deaton and Muellbauer (19806) and Ray (1982) 
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The labor supply functions look definitely nonlinear, which underlínes the need to use flexible functional forms.
The male labor supply function is backward bending in the lower ranges of wm and forward bending for high values of wm. Male labor supply is rather inelastic, both with respect to wf and wm. Apart from the familiar interpreta[ion that substitution and income effect more or less cancel out, this finding may also point at institutional constraints which keep most males at a 40-hour work week. Notice that hR tends to be m even less elastíc with respect to wm in ratíoned families, where the female does not have a paid job. These appear to be the traditional families where the female does not work and the male has a full-time (4 0 houra a week) job. Note that hm is perfectly inelastic with respect to wf, as it should be and that hm~hm íf hf -0.
Female labor supply is more responsive than male labor supply to both the male and the female wage rate. If the male wage rate goes up, female labor supply falls. If the female wage rate rises, female labor supply rises as well.
The estimates of the parameters am and af, representing the effect of family size on labor supply, are such that the requirement that a log C~a log N is posítive is statisfied for all sample points.
That is, the cost of attaining a certain utility level increases with family size.
Obviously, the highest female participation rate and the largest number of hours worked by the female, occurs in families without children. When there are children, the female participation rate is very low, unless the male wage rate is low or the female wage rate is very high.
In all cases male labor supply is rather inelaetic with respect to family size.
Finally, we have investigated whether the shadow wage of a nonparticipating female exceeded her predicted market wage. In 76Y of all one earner household this requirement was satisfied. The fact that wf~wf in the other cases might be interpreted as an indication of involuntary unemployment.
In either case, the rationing of the one earner households is modelled appropríately. However, using numerical methods, we have estimated a household labor supply model using data on both one earner and two earner families, and using flexible functional forms.
The labor supply functions in figure 1 look definitely non- 
